This study examined the cognitive underpinnings of spontaneous imagination in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by wayofindividual differences. Children with ASD ( N ¼ 27) and matched typically developing (TD) children werea dministered Karmiloff-Smith's (1990) imaginative drawing task, along with measures that tapped specific executive functions (generativity,v isuospatial planning, and central coherencep rocessing style) and false belief theoryofmind (ToM) understanding. The ASD group drawings displayed deficits in imaginativec ontent and ap iecemeal pictorial style.A SD participants also showed group deficits in generativity,planning and To M, and exhibited weak coherence. Individual differences in generativity werer elated to imaginative drawing content in the ASD group,a nd the association was mediated through planning ability.V ariations in weak coherence weres eparately related to ap iecemeal drawing style in the ASD group.V ariations in generativity werea lso linked with imaginative drawing content in the TD group; the connection unfolded when it received pooled variance from receptive language ability,a nd thereupon mediated through false belief reasoning to cue imaginativec ontent. Results ared iscussed in terms of how generativity plays a broad and important role for imagination in ASD and typical development, albeit in different ways.
This study examined the cognitive underpinnings of spontaneous imagination in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by wayofindividual differences. Children with ASD ( N ¼ 27) and matched typically developing (TD) children werea dministered Karmiloff-Smith's (1990) imaginative drawing task, along with measures that tapped specific executive functions (generativity,v isuospatial planning, and central coherencep rocessing style) and false belief theoryofmind (ToM) understanding. The ASD group drawings displayed deficits in imaginativec ontent and ap iecemeal pictorial style.A SD participants also showed group deficits in generativity,planning and To M, and exhibited weak coherence. Individual differences in generativity werer elated to imaginative drawing content in the ASD group,a nd the association was mediated through planning ability.V ariations in weak coherence weres eparately related to ap iecemeal drawing style in the ASD group.V ariations in generativity werea lso linked with imaginative drawing content in the TD group; the connection unfolded when it received pooled variance from receptive language ability,a nd thereupon mediated through false belief reasoning to cue imaginativec ontent. Results ared iscussed in terms of how generativity plays a broad and important role for imagination in ASD and typical development, albeit in different ways.
There is one group of individuals forw homs pontaneous and fantasticala cts of imagination appear to be af ormidable challenge:c hildren with autism (CWA). While there has been prolific researcho ns ocial interaction and communication in autism, researchfocusing on cognitive processes underpinning acts of imagination has been less prominent (Frith, 2003) . Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) proposed that the ability to represent fantastical entities that do note xist except in our own minds may involveadistinct neuro-cognitive mechanism that is selectively impaired in autism. Theyassessed imagination deficitsin autism through Karmiloff-Smith's( 1990) 'Drawa nI mpossible Person' task. CWA, in contrast to typically developing (TD) children and children with moderate learning disability (MLD), failed at drawing impossible pictures.Ninety-two percent of the CWA group drew reallooking people instead. These results were replicated by Craig, BaronCohen, and Scott (2001) with children on the higher-functioning subgroup on the autistic spectrum of Asperger'sS yndrome. Against the patterno ffi ndings from BaronCohen and his colleagues,L eeversa nd Harris( 1998) using ap icture completion task reportedt hat all groups (TD,C WA,a nd MLD) accurately applied patterns that would classify ad rawing as being impossible looking (e.g. colouring asnowmanb lack).
Imaginative drawings
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (e.g. Craig et al.,2001; Scott &Baron-Cohen, 1996) suggested that their observations of autisms pectrumd isorder (ASD) impairments in imaginative drawing attempts can be viewedasexpressions of deficits in understanding how beliefs can be decoupled from reality,w hich are linkedt ot heoryo fm ind (ToM) mechanism abnormalities.I nc ontrast, Leevers and Harrisp roposed that the difficulty forCWA lies in carryingout visuospatial plans to produce an entire novel drawing rather than in imagination or mentals tate understanding. In reply,B aron-Cohen and his colleagues contended that Leevers and Harris' tasks may have been too easy and argued that if there is an imaginative impairment pers e ,t he task focus should be on spontaneous drawings wherechildrenare required to explicitly manipulate knowledge structures in hypothetical ways. The flagshipstudies by Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) and Leevers and Harris( 1998) concentrated only on demonstrating or challenging the magnitude of ASD group impairments in imagination against background researcho n ToMv ersus executive dysfunction. If ap articular cognitive deficit is principally responsible fori magination impairments in ASD,t hen variance in the display of that cognitive skill should be related to the extent and variability of imagination shown.
The present study Our main issue of interest was to assess the putative linksb etween individual differences in the abilityt or epresent imaginative drawing content with executive function versus ToMu sing correlationala nalyses. Based on Scott and Baron-Cohen's (1996) contention that imagination impairment may be areflection of deficits in mental state understanding, variation in false belief attribution should be related to individual differences in imaginative drawing content in our ASD group. However,several lines of evidence qualify against such an expectation.
First, the developmental literature on pictorial skills indicates that even young TD children can, through example priming, show above averageperformance in the range and complexity of imaginative ideas depicted (e.g. Hollis&Low,2005; Low,2006; Zhi, Thomas, &R obinson, 1997) .G roup differences in the application of imaginative drawing ideas between ASD and TD children can even disappear under prompted conditions (e.g. Leevers &H arris, 1998) . Second,v arious measures of language ability have been found to correlate with standard false belief ToMmeasures, in both ASD and in typical development (e.g. Fisher,Happé ,&Dunn, 2005; Milligan, Astington, &Dack, 2007) .F isher et al. reported that the correlation between receptive grammar ability and false belief comprehension is even stronger in ASD than in normal development.
Theysuggested that CWAuse and depend on language as afocalpoint to scaffold mental state understanding. Such evidence implies that the strengtho ft he contended ASD association linking false belief mentalstate understanding and imagination may become non-significanto nce variance due to receptive language (and chronological age) is removed. Furthermore, while there is as trong association betweenl anguage and executive function in typical development (e.g.H ughes, 1996) ,c hildren with ASD do not appear to reliably use or depend on language fort he service of executive control (e.g. Joseph, McGrath, &T ager-Flusberg,2 005; Russell,1 997).T hesefi ndings, in turn, suggest that variations in executive function would remain uniquely related to the display of imagination in ASD even after variance due to receptive language (and chronological age) is partialled out.C onsequently,w ee xpected that variations in imaginative drawing content would be uniquely tied to executive function performance forour ASD group relative to our TD control group. The study of executive function in relation to imagination in ASD must be constrained because executive control as a construct on its own is too broad. It is important to be clear about mechanisms underpinning achievements in creative thought. There is evidence delineating at least two specific executive processes that may be important fori magination in ASD: generativity and planning.
In the related area of pretend play in ASD, Turner (1997) argued that generativity,the ability to generate novel ideas, is ak ey locus of difficulty where virtual symbolic production is concerned. Turner maintains that difficulties in generating hypothetical schemes necessaryfor flexible thought is able to capture the heterogeneity that exists in the display of imagination in ASD,asimpaired generativitywould have implications at all levels of behaviour.H er theoretical positioni ss upported by several lines of evidence indicating that: (1) CWAp roduce pretend play acts at as lower rate than control counterparts (e.g. Jarrold, Boucher,&Smith, 1996) and (2) external prompts can help CWAe ngagei np retencea nd entertain counterfactual propositions (e.g. Lewis & Boucher, 1 988) . Further relevance of generativity fors pontaneous imagination via drawings comes from studies by Lewis and Boucher (1991) and Turner (1999) . Lewis and Boucher found that the successive pictures of everydayobjectsproduced by CWA showed ah igh degree of thematic relatedness, as compared to control participants. Turner also uncovered that CWAofdifferent abilitylevels were more likely than control participants to generate fewer novel responses when attempting to produce as many interpretations as possible form eaningless two dimensional patterns. The salience of generativity forfl exible symbolic production in ASD has primarily been tested and supported with respect to pretend play (Rutherford &Rogers, 2003) . Scott and BaronCohen (1996) reported that generativity deficitsd id not occur alongside failures at producing impossible entity drawings in their autismgroup. However,their findings are difficulttoresolve as theyonly used one item from the usesofobjectsgenerativitytask (novel uses forabrick) (Lezak, Howieson, &L oring, 2004) .G iven Turner's (1999) comprehensive study showing ASD deficits in naming novel usesf or ad iverse set of given objectsand also deficitsinproducing daring interpretations of line drawings,we predicted that variations in generativityw ould relate to individual differences in imagining unreal things in ASD.
The relationship between generativity and imagination in ASD could, however,b e mediated by at hird factor.L eeversa nd Harris( 1998) have specificallyp ostulated that spontaneous imaginative drawings are difficultf or CWAb ecause such displays require the micro-deployment of newand potentiallycomplexvisuospatial plans; consequently, participants may instead re-executee asy and already familiar graphic procedures.
Theirreasoning fits with researchondrawings by TD children showing that visuospatial planning (e.g. shapec ontrast, axis orientation) is an important control factor that is involved in novel picture production (e.g. Freeman, 1987; Low &Hollis, 2003; Thomas &S ilk,1 990) . CWA'ss uccess with imaginative picture completion tasks that have reduced planning demands also dovetails with researchshowing that such children have specific group deficitso nm easures of visuospatial planning (e.g.P rior &H offmann, 1990) .A ccordingly,e veni fi ndividuals with ASD are able to generate imaginative drawing ideas, those ideas may not be graphicallytranslated on paper without acertain degree of visuospatial finesse. We predicted that forour ASD group, as compared to our TD control group, variations in generativity would relate to individual differences in imaginative drawing ability and the relationship would be mediated through variance in visuospatial skills.
Impairments in generativity and planning are undoubtedly not able to accountfor all aspects of imaginative drawing behavioursi nA SD.F or example, it is difficultf or a generativity based account to explain why children with ASD,compared to TD children, tend to pursue drawings of everyday objectsb yb eginning with local features and completing them in anon-sequential manner (e.g. Booth, Charlton, Hughes, &Happé , 2003) .InBooth et al. 's study,the extent of the circumscribed drawing style of the ASD participants wasevenunrelated to their planning abilities. Such presentations appear to fit with predictions made by Happé (2003) whereby the concepto f( weak) central coherence captures visual and spatial processing styles associated with the disorder,and explains superiority in tasks where local processing is advantageous.T he relevanceo f generativity and planning along with weak coherence fori maginative drawing behavioursinASD are clearly notmutually exclusive. Following Turner (1997) , we argue that variations in imaginative drawing abilityt hat are shapedb ye xecutive functioning weaknesses in generativity and planning may also be maintained by executive strengths towards weak central coherence.W epredicted that while generativity and visuospatial planning abilities would relate to the extento fi maginative drawing content produced by children with ASD,those children'sindividual biases towardsweak coherence would link specifically with drawing style.
In our study,w em easured imagination in ASD through Karmiloff-Smith's( 1990) drawing task. An unprompted task protocol was used as Baron-Cohen and colleagues have maintained that impairments in representing non-veridical content can only be detected and understood through such ap rocedure. However,fi ndings revealed through an unprompted procedure could still convergew ith researchs uggesting that executive functioning has considerable performance-competence implications for imagination,e specially if we uncover,a sw as hypothesized here, that variations in impossible entity drawings produced by children with ASD would be most strongly associated with generativity, planning, and weak coherencestyle.
Method
Participants Participants in the ASD group were independently diagnosed and confirmed with either autism ( N ¼ 18) or Asperger'ss yndrome( N ¼ 9) using Diagnostic andS tatistical Manual -4 th ed. criteria by at least two of ac linical psychologist, paediatrician and as peech pathologist.P articipants were recruited through specialist mentalh ealth units around Wellington in New Zealand. The ASD group in this study consisted of 27 participants (23 males) with ac hronological ager angeo f5 .25-13.08 years ( M ¼ 8 : 26 years; SD ¼ 2 : 17). The mean chronological age( along with standard deviationand range) of our ASD group was in line with the participant characteristics of Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) and Leevers and Harris( 1998) .T he verbal mentala ge (VMA)ofthe ASD group ranged from 4.00 to 10.83 years(M ¼ 6 : 29 years; SD ¼ 2 : 23). The TD control group participants were recruited from primaryschools in Wellington. Participants in the TD group were chosen to match participants in the ASD group on VMA and gender.P articipants in the TD group ( N ¼ 27; 23 males) aged between 4.50 and 10.67years ( M ¼ 6 : 60 years; SD ¼ 1 : 31). The VMA of the TD group ranged between 4.00 and 10.83y ears( M ¼ 6 : 16 years; SD ¼ 2 : 09). Participants in the ASD group were older than those in the TD group, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼11: 70, p , : 001. The absence of significant differences on VMA ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼0 : 05, p . : 05) wasc onsistent with groups being matched on this variable.
Measure of VMAand receptivelanguage ability
Receptive language abilityw as assessed using the TROG-2 (Bishop, 2003) . Scores on number of blocks passed were converted to VMA scores, according to instructions in the manual. Previous studies on imaginative drawings in ASD have used the TROG to match groups in terms of VMA (e.g. Leevers &H arris, 1998; Scott &B aron-Cohen, 1996) .D rawing from Fisher et al. (2005) ,r aw TROG-2s cores of receptive language ability were used in correlation analyses to clarify the relationship betweenc ognition and imagination.
Measureso fe xecutive function Generativity; uses of objects and pattern meanings tasks The two tasks, uses of objectsand patternmeanings, were taken from Turner's(1999) study measuring the abilityt og enerate diversen ovel ideas in autism. Bishop and Norbury (2005) recently confirmed that ac ombined score as derived from these two tasks is especially sensitive towards detecting weaknesses in generativity in autism. In the uses of objectstask, participants were shown one object at at ime and asked to generate uses forwhich it could be put: abrick; acup; apencil;apiece of doweling; a piece of fabric; and apiece of elastic. The first threeobjects had obvious conventional uses while the latter three did not. Order of presentation of conventional and nonconventional objectswas counterbalanced, but within each object group, the order of items remained the same. Foreach conventional item, atypical use (e.g.acup could be used to drink from)and anovel use (e.g.acup could be used as adoll's hat) were given. For each non-conventional item, anovel use wassuggested (e.g.apiece of elastic could be used as acatapult). Following the example suggestions, participants were invited to: 'tell me all the other ways you think a[object] could be useful'. Participants weregiven 2 1 2 minutes fore ach object.F ollowing Bishop and Norbury, each ideaw as codeda s either acorrect response(aplausible use, such as using apiece of cloth to make adoll's shirt), an incorrect response (a vague or implausible use, such as eating the brick), a repetition (identical to aprevious responsefor that specific item or any previous item), aredundantresponse (varying in some small wayfrom aprevious response, such saying abrick could be used to makeashed after saying it could be used to make ahouse) or a not-useful response( such as carry the brick).
The second generativity task, patternmeanings, used fivemeaningless line drawings, each printed on separate pieces of paper.E ach participant was presented with one practice item and fivetest items. Forthe practice item, the experimenter asked, 'What could this look like?' Responses were praised and other suggestion prompts were offered such as: 'a hedgehog'a nd 'a brush'. Participants were then shown the test stimuli one by one, and fore ach design were asked to think of as many things as possible that it could be. Eachparticipant wasgiven 2 1 2 minutes to respond to each item. Bishopa nd Norbury's( 2005) scoring instructions were adopted and responsesw ere coded as acorrect response(aplausible interpretation), an incorrect response(avague or implausible interpretation), ar epetitionoraredundant response.
Agreement between two independent raterscoding over 1,500 responses was 90% fort he uses of objectsa nd 94% fort he patternm eanings tasks. All differences were resolved upon discussion. In agreement with Bishopa nd Norbury ( 2005), there was a significant correlation betweent he uses of objectsa nd pattern meanings tasks fort he proportion of correct responses ( r ¼ : 47, N ¼ 54, p , : 001). Following Bishopa nd Norbury,then, the mean proportionofcorrect responses across both tasks was taken as am easure of generativity.
Visuospatial planning; mazes task
This task wast aken from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale forC hildren (WISC-III; Weschler,1 992). Following instructions in the manual, scores fore ach maze were determined according to the number of errorsm ade. High scores indicated good visuospatial planning ability (max score ¼ 28 points).W echsler'sm azes has been used to measure visuospatial planning abilityinTDand ASD groups (e.g. Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, &M aley, 2006 Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, &K arp, 1971 ) was used to gauget he level at which participants showed ab ias in information processings tyle towards weak coherence.F ollowing Pellicano et al. (2006) , participants were shown ac ardboard cut-out of at arget shapea nd asked to find the same target shape hidden within the larger complexp icture as quicklya st heyc ould. Also following Pellicano et al.,amaximum of 30 secondsw as allowed to successfully completeeach trial. If aparticular trial was not completed within this time limit, ascore of 30 secondswas recorded forthat trial. By averaging latency times across all 25 trials, a mean score wascalculated, with alow score indicating atendency forweak coherence.
Measureso ft heoryo fm ind
The ToMtask batterycomprised one trial of the unexpected transfer(Sally-Anne) firstorder false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &Frith, 1985) ,one trial of the unexpected contents (smarties) first-order false belief task (Gopnik &Slaughter,1991) ,and one trial of the John-Marys econd-order false belief task (Baron-Cohen, 1989) .A ll tasksw ere acted out with dolls and props.I nt he unexpected contents task, participants were asked botha bout anotherd oll's and their own false belief. In the second-ordert ask, participants werea sked about ac haracter'sf alse belief and to justify it. Hence, across all ToMt asks, we asked at otal of fivef alse belief questions (one fort he unexpected transfert ask, two fort he unexpected contents task, and two fort he John-Maryt ask).
Participants passed the control questions found in these tasks. Following Baron-Cohen's (1989) scoring details, participants' answerstothe false belief justification question in the second-order task were coded into one of three categories according to whether the participant accounted for: (a) John and Mary'sbeliefs (second-order; 2points); (b) John or Mary'sb eliefs (first-order; 1p oint); or (c) neither of the characters' beliefs (zeroorder; 0points). Tworatersb lind to group diagnosis coded the justification responses with 100% reliability.Points across the first-order false belief questions (maximum score of 3) and second-order false belief questions (maximum of 3) were summed to give a composite ToMscore ranging from 0to6.Whilstthe composite score allowed us, to a certain extent, to take into account the continuous nature of ToMdevelopment, we also analysed performance on first-and second-order false belief understanding separately.
Measure of imaginative drawing
Imagination was measured using Karmiloff-Smith's( 1990) drawing task. Following Hollisa nd Low's( 2005) lead, we slightly modified the presentation contexto f the Karmiloff-Smith task to makec lear its requirement. Participants were first shown apicture of people walking towards asparkling door that opened on to apath leading to ad istant planet in space. The scene was set as follows. 'These people are walking through am agicd oor that sendst hem to live on af araway differentp lanet in space. When people walk through the door,t heyg et magicallyc hanged into funny,s trange looking people that no one has ever seen before. Drawasmanypictures as youcan of what people coming out of the door would look like, making the changed people look as funny and strangel ooking as youc an.'H ollis and Low argued that such minor modifications to the contexto ft he drawing task helps childrenu nderstand the task withouts acrificing the essential structural requirement of explicitly manipulating knowledge to entertain and produce non-veridical content. We further reasoned that the use of scores based on the proportion of imaginative ideas averaged over several drawings would increase the reliability of our behavioural measure relative to prior studies that operationalised their dependent measure of the abilityt or epresent imaginative content based on as ingled rawing (e.g. Scott &B aron-Cohen, 1996) . Participants were instructedtodepict each drawing on aseparate piece of paper. Each drawing was taken away after it wasfi nished. No time limit was imposed.
The experimenter also discretely recorded what feature of the picture wasd rawn first, what featurew as drawn second, third, and so on. The recordings of the entire drawing process by the experimenter was labour intensive but was necessarya st he comprehensive notes about the organizationo ft he drawing enabled us to carefully determine whether children started their drawings with local or global components, and whether children structured their drawings in as equentialf ashion. After the drawings were completed, when participants indicated that theyc ould not think of anything else to draw, the experimenter invited participants to describe the content of each drawing that had been produced. All responseswere praisedand recorded. In this manner,w ehad ample data describing the content of each drawing, and also how the drawing itself stylistically unfolded.
We also checked, after childrenfi nished the imaginative drawing task,w hether participants were able to drawanormal looking human figure. All participants wereable to do so.S uch checks allowed us to confirmt hat the content coded in the pretend people drawings did indeed constitute novela nd imaginative changes. Example drawings produced by participants in the ASD group forthe imagination task areshown in Figure 1 . We will explicate the coding of imaginative content by wayofthese example drawings.
Each feature drawn was coded according to whether or not it was imaginative. Following scoring criteria and techniques usedb yM arsh, Landau, and Hicks (1996) , dividing the number of features that were imaginative by the total number of features drawn constituted the proportion of imaginative content fore ach picture. For example,o ne ASD participant drew am an with antennaea sh is pretend looking person (see Figure 1A) . In this case there were at otal of six main features: the head, face,body,arms/hands, legs/feet, and antennae. There was only one imaginative feature, the antennae. Hence, the proportion of imaginative content fort hat drawing was 0.17 (1/6). Another ASD participant described his drawing of apretend looking person as having 'fire on his head, and has claws all over his arms and legs' (see Figure 1B) . Correspondingly, there were three imaginative features( targeted to theh ead, arms/hands, and legs/feet) and two standardf eatures( the face and body), and the proportion of imaginative content wascalculated as 0.6 (3/5). As the examples in Figure  1A and 1B show,s uccessful instantiations of pretend looking people 'introduced appropriate changes while simultaneously retaining core concepts of personhood' (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990, p. 62) .W hen participants instead drew realp eople fort heir imaginative drawings,w ith standard looking heads, faces, arms/hands, bodies,a nd legs/feet (see Figure 1C) , then the proportion of imaginative content was 0(0/5). In this manner,t he proportion of imaginative content was calculated fore ach drawing produced by participants in the ASD and TD groups. Then the overall mean proportion of imaginative content drawn was calculated fore ach participant by averaging the proportion scores across all drawings produced.
Overall agreement betweentwo independent raterscoding across all drawings was 90%. Superficial changes that were possible in reality (e.g.hairstyle) did not constitute as imaginative features. Drawings of completely differentb ut realentities (e.g. animals at the zoo) were also not considered as successful non-veridical instantiations.I nt hese cases,participants receivedazeroscore forthe proportion of imaginative content found in those respective drawings.
Aside from extent of imagination, we also analysed the drawings produced in terms of style. Twod imensions of style were coded: the initial feature drawn and fragmentation. Following the coding criteria set up by Booth et al. (2003) ,f or each drawing, initial features weres cored on at hree point scale. Twop oints wereg iven when alocal featurewas drawn first, and one point wasallocated when alocal feature was the second thing drawn.Zero points were given when aglobal feature was drawn first. Figure 2shows an example of adrawing from aparticipant with ASD scoring two points fort he initial feature dimension.
Using notes accompanying each picture specifying the drawing process,t wo independent ratersreached 93% agreement on coding of initial features. All differences were resolved upon discussion.A veraging across drawings, all participants receiveda mean initial feature score.
The second dimension of drawing style we coded was fragmentation. Following Booth et al. (2003) , fragmentation was scoredo nathreep oint scale from highly fragmented (2 points) to not at all fragmented (0 points). We also used their operationalisation of fragmentation as being' the degree of disjointed appearance, separation of parts or drawing style that was not sequential' (p.389). To illustrate, the example drawing showni nF igure 2s cored two points forf ragmentation. Again, with recourse to the notes accompanying each picture specifying the drawing process, two independent ratersreached 89% agreement on coding of fragmentation. All differences were resolved upon discussion.A veraging across drawings, all participants receiveda mean fragmentation score. We summed scores across both dimensions (initialf eature and fragmentation) to give each child ad rawing style score (maximum total of 4) whereby the higher the score, the greater the tendency to adopt aw eak coherence graphic style (Booth et al.,2 003).
Procedure
All participants weres een individually by an experimenter in aq uiet room at home (for the ASD group) or at school (for the TD group). All tasks were administered in around four 0.5-to 1-hour sessions that were approximately 1week apart. Order of tasks was semi-random so that it was comparable across groups. Due to the time involved for TROG-2, this measure was administeredfi rst. In the second session, the imaginative drawing task wasadministered alongside the ToMtasks. Also during the second session, the normal person drawing check was given after the imaginative drawing task (in this manner,w ea voided prepotentc anonical human figured rawing activations from spillinginto the imagination task). The planning and central coherence tasks were given at the third session. The generativityt asks were presented at the final session. Heightened imaginative responding from the drawing task should have faded by the last sessionsoa sn ot to bias performance on the generativityt asks.
Results

Group differences
The group means ( M ), standardd eviations ( SD), and 95% confidenceintervals ( CI )o n keym easures of interest are provided in Table 1 . Prior to conducting am ultivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA ), the Mahalanobis distance procedure (set at p , .001) (Tabachnick &Fidell, 2001 ) was used to identify outliers. No multivariate outlierswere identified, fort he ASD or TD groups. The results of the MANOVA that included all key measures revealed as ignificant overall group difference ( F ð 11; 42Þ¼4 : 01, p , : 01; h Follow-up one-way ANOVA sw ere performed to test differences between the ASD and TD groups on individual variables. These results were reconfirmed via pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments. There was no group difference in the actual numbero fp ictures attempted fort he imaginative drawing task, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼0 : 21, p . : 05. All participants in bothg roups provideda ni nitial drawing attempt. With respect to the initial attempt, 93% of the TD group and 59% of the ASD group managed to produce ap icture with impossible features. At least half of the participants in both groups also attempted as econda nd third drawing fort he imagination task. For participants who attempted asecond drawing, 100% (21/21) of the children in the TD group included imaginative featureswhile 68% (15/22) of children in the ASD group did so. For participants who attempted at hird drawing, 100% of the children in the TD group (19/19) included imaginative features while 73% of the children in the ASD group (11/15) did so. Overall, at the levelofextent to which each picture is impossible, the ASD group included proportionally fewer imaginative features averaged across their drawings as compared to the TD group, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼9 : 40, p , : 01. We also checked that the lower rate of imaginative drawing content in the ASD group was not because the children provided more non-imaginative features overall -t he amount of nonimaginative drawing content did not differ between-groups ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼0 : 42, p . : 05; MASD ¼ 0 : 53; and M TD ¼ 0 : 49). Finally, the drawings produced by the ASD group Ta ble 1. Means ( M ), standarddeviations ( SD), and 95% confidence intervals ( CI )for various task scores in the ASD ( N ¼ 27) and TD ( N ¼ 27) groups showed more of al ocal coherence graphic style compared to the TD group, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼9 : 36, p , : 01. Compared with the TD group, children in the ASD group had significantly lower generativity scores ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼4 : 15, p , : 05) and lower visuospatial planning scores ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼5 : 37, p , : 05). The ASD group displayed significantly faster times on the embedded figures task (showing weaker coherence)c ompared to the TD group ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼4 : 38, p , : 05).A lso against the TD group, the ASD group obtained significantly lower composite scoreso nt he ToMb attery( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼10: 29, p , : 01); the difference remained when the batteryw as separated into first-( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼11: 88, p , : 01) and second-order false belief tasks ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼5 : 05, p , : 05).
Prominence of executive functionsinr elation to imaginative drawing behaviours
Associations involving executive function and ToMw ith imaginative drawing were examinedf or the ASD and TD groups separately.
ASD group
The significant associations found fort he ASD group (full and partial)a re reported in Table 2 . Table 2a lso includes associations amongste xecutive function, ToMa nd receptive languagea bility.I nk eeping with the primaryf ocus of our study,w e necessarily limito ur results section to explaining correlations relevant to imaginative drawing behaviours.H owever,w ew ill weavei nto our discussion those other cooccurring relationships where theymight assist in illuminating the cognitive processes underpinning imagination. For the ASD group, bivariate correlations indicated that the proportiono f imaginative contentdrawn was correlated with generativity,visuospatial planning, and composite ToM(as well as ToMdecomposed as first-order tasks). However,visuospatial planning and generativitya ccounted form ore variance towardst he proportion of imaginative content drawn ( r 2 ¼ : 53 and : 42, respectively) compared to composite or first-order ToM(r 2 ¼ : 18 and : 22, respectively). Bivariate correlations also indicated that individual differences in the stylistic manner by which drawings were produced were related to variations in embedded figures task scores (i.e. the faster the ASD children were at the embedded figures task, the more likely their drawings started with local features and proceeded in adisjointed manner).The relationship between weak central coherence and drawing style remained even after full partial correlation analysis. When the effectso fr eceptive languagea bility were controlled alongside chronological age, only generativity and visuospatial planning remained associated with the proportionof imaginative content drawn. Such relationshipswereconsistent with our otherfindings fort he ASD group: while receptive language abilityw as connected to ToM; language ability was not extensively; or widely related to executive skills.
Full partial correlation analyses suggested that generativitya nd visuospatial planning performance were botha ssociated with the proportion of imaginative content drawn. Theseresults were further refined by aregression analysis conducted to examine whether generativity and visuospatial planningc ontributed unique variancet o imaginative drawing content in the ASD group. Bivariate correlation analysesh ad indicated that receptive languagea bilityw as associated with chronological agei nt he ASDg roup.H ence,i nt he stepwisel inearr egressiona nalysis, thee ffects of chronological age( b ¼ 0 : 27; p . : 05) and language ability( b ¼ 0 : 24; p . : 05) were jointly removedatt he first step ( R 2 ¼ : 19, F ð 2 ; 24Þ¼2 : 75, p . : 05). Generativity and visuospatial planning scores were entered in the second and third steps respectively, in line with our theoretically guided hypothesis that successful solutions to KarmiloffSmith'si maginative drawing task may require participants to initially generate an ovel idea before needing to spatially plan it (cf. Turner,1 997; Leevers &H arris, 1998) . Variation in generativity wasfound to be auniquepredictor of differences in imaginative drawing content, independent of chronological age, and language ability, b ¼ 0 : 61, D R 2 ¼ : 24, F ð 1 ; 23Þ¼9 : 75, p , : 01. Visuospatial planning also accountedf or further uniquev ariance, b ¼ 0 : 54, D R 2 ¼ : 19, F ð 1 ; 22Þ¼10: 93, p , : 01. Such affirmative results on their own are still insufficienta sw eh ad, when introducing underlying mechanisms influencing imagination in ASD,specifically hypothesized that forthe ASD group, visuospatial planning mediates the relationship between generativity and imaginative drawing content. Our mediation hypothesis was tested using the computer programme 'MedGraph' using the procedure set out fori ts use by Jose (2003) . First, sample size and correlation coefficientsbetween the variables of interest were entered. Second, the potential mediator (visuospatial planning) wasr egressed on generativity ( b ¼ 0 : 58, F ð 1 ; 25Þ¼12: 84, p , : 001). Third, imaginative drawing content scores were regressed on bothvisuospatial planning ( b ¼ 0 : 53; p , : 01) and generativity(b ¼ 0 : 35; p , : 05) ( R 2 ¼ : 61; F ð 2 ; 24Þ¼18: 69, p , : 001). The relevant regression data were entered intot he 'MedGraph'p rogrammew hich analysed form ediation.T he significance of Sobel's z 2 value ¼ 2 : 41, p , : 05, revealed full mediation; when visuospatial planning as the mediator wasc onsidered, the correlation between generativity and imaginative drawing content ( r ¼ : 65, p , : 01) reduced to an onsignificant level ( r ¼ : 35, p . : 05) and the b weight of the direct effect of generativity to imagination dropped to non-significance (from b ¼ 0 : 35 to 0 : 04, p . : 05).
TD group
We now proceed to detail associations relatingtoimaginative drawing behavioursinthe TD group. Significant correlations are reported in Table 3 .
Full bivariate correlations revealed that variations in the number of pictures produced, receptive language,g enerativity, and ToMw ere all positivelyr elated to differences in the proportion of imaginative content found in TD children'sd rawings. Furthermore, variations in then umbero fd rawings produced were linkedt o chronological age, receptive languagea bility,g enerativity, and visuospatial planning at the bivariate level. Whene ffects associated with receptive language ability were controlled alongsidec hronological age, only first-order ToMr emained positively associated with the proportion of imaginative content drawn.
Overall, compared to the ASD group, the wayi nw hich imaginative drawings amongstTDchildren wasbrought about was framed against arelationally complexweb entangling thought and language.F or example, even with just chronological age controlled, we observedt hat generativity and receptive language were each related to imaginative content ( r ¼ : 47, p , : 05 and r ¼ : 41, p , : 05, respectively) and also each related to first-order ToM(r ¼ : 53, p , : 01 and r ¼ : 51, p , : 05, respectively). Not only were generativitya nd receptive language diversely related to otherc onstructs, they were also positivelycorrelated with each other when we only controlled forthe effects of general maturation ( r ¼ : 65, p , : 01).Generativity coupled with receptive language ability may be ap otential compound process underpinning imagination in normal development that was obscured from correlation analysesb yh ow the two constructs share and spreadtheir variance. Consequently, to capture strong information processing affordancesp rovided by bidirectional interactions between generativitya nd receptive language ability ( Bloom, 1994) , we distilled an ew compound construct that summed their respective z -scores.W et hen conducted ar egression analysis to allow ac loser inspection of whether the following were predictive of imaginative drawing content in the TD group: (1) generativity interacting with language and (2) first-order ToM. Astepwise linear regression analysis wasconducted with effects of general maturation ( b ¼ 0 : 13) and visuospatial planning ( b ¼ 0 : 23) entered at the first step, R 2 ¼ : 10, F ð 2 ; 24Þ¼1 : 37, p . : 05. Visuospatial planning was also jointly entered into the first step because it was correlated with chronological age, and the TD group had demonstratedsuperiorplanning skills.V ariation in generativityand receptive language combined was enteredinthe second step and was asignificant predictor of differences in imaginative drawing content, b ¼ 0 : 52, D R As ac heck, we re-ran the regression analyses where,instead of an interactive compound construct, generativitya nd receptive languagew ere entereda ss eparate variables at the second step of the analyses. Separately,n either generativity nor receptive language was able to cue imagination (all p s . : 05).
Our TD group regression findings were also framed against significant tripartite associations connecting the generativity-languagec ompound,fi rst-order ToM, and imaginative content. The existence of tripartite correlations suggests that mediational processes could be operating (Baron &K enny, 1 986) . Compared to our theoretically predicted mediation analysis fort he ASD group, testing form ediation in the TD group was data-guided. However,there is extant concurrentand longitudinal researchwith TD groups suggesting: (1) generativitya nd language can each supportt he display and emergence of false belief reasoning (e.g. Milligan et al.,2007; P eterson &R iggs, 1999) and (2) false belief reasoning supports creative thinking (e.g. Suddendorf &F letcherFlinn, 1999) . Consequently,w em ay be reasonably confident in speculating that in typicald evelopment,g enerativityi nc oncertw ith language may be related to imagination but the effect might be an indirect one that emerges through false belief reasoning.W et ested fors uch mediation using the 'MedGraph' computer programme (Jose, 2003) . First, sample size and correlation coefficients between the variables of interest wereentered.Second, the potential mediator (first-order ToM) was regressed on the generativitya nd languagec ompound ( b ¼ 0 : 60; F ð 1 ; 25Þ¼14: 29, p , : 001). Third, imaginative drawing content scoresw ere regressed on both the compound construct ( b ¼ 0 : 17; p . : 05) and first-order ToM( b ¼ 0 : 61; p , : 01)( R 2 ¼ : 52; F ð 2 ; 24Þ¼12: 87, p , : 001). The relevant data weree ntered into the 'MedGraph' programme and the significance of Sobel's z 2 value ¼ 2 : 52, p , : 05, revealedf ull mediation; whenfi rst-order ToMa st he mediator was considered, the correlation between theg enerativity-language compounda nd imaginative drawingc ontent ( r ¼ : 53, p , : 01) became non-significant( r ¼ : 17, p . : 05) and the b weight of the direct effect of generativity and language combinedf or imagination dropped to non-significance (from b ¼ 0 : 17 to 2 0 : 18, p . : 05).
Despite the routes in our mediation analysis forthe TD group being consistent with literature indicating that generativitya nd language are important to false belief reasoning,and that false belief understanding can supportcreative problem solving, the analysis was still ad hoc.Given our concurrentdata, we needtobecautious by checking the potential foraninitial route that begins with variation in children'sT oM supporting generativity and language ability ( Perner, 1 998) . The possibility that generativity in combination with receptive language mediated the relationship from first-order ToM to imagination wasn ot significant (Sobel's z 2 value ¼ 0 : 88, p . : 05). Our overall mediation findings suggest that, amongstTDchildren, in order formeta-representational knowledge to be useful forp rocessing imaginative drawing solutions,g enerativity and receptive language skills are needed towards scaffolding such understanding.
Discussion
This study makes important contributions to clarifying the relationship involving executive function versus ToMwith spontaneous imagination in ASD.The proportion of imaginative drawing content found in the pictures generated by the ASD group was significantly lower compared to that of the TD group. Even at the initial drawing attempt, only 59% of children in the ASD group succeeded in producing ap icture containing imaginative features, compared to 93% of participants in the TD group whosucceeded in doingso. In these ways, the present results replicated Scott and Baron-Cohen's(1996) findings of impairments in the spontaneous production of non-veridical representations amongstchildren with ASD.Nonetheless, in Scott and Baron-Cohen'sstudy,only 8% of their autism group produced asingleimaginative picture. The storysetting could have made our drawing task more contextually meaningful forseveral of the ASD participants, mappingwith the suggestion that executive functioning can underpin performance in drawing impossible entities. Indeed, the results supported our hypothesis in uncovering that, in ASD,a longside group deficits in generativitya nd planning, variation in those executive skills (insteado fm entalistic understanding) were robustly associated with differences in imaginative thinking. These results not only fit with previous research showing how generativityi si mplicated in play behaviourss een in autism( e.g. Jarrold et al.,1 996),b ut also confirmT urner's( 1997) theoretical suggestion that difficulties in generating spontaneous hypothetical schemes can explainA SD heterogeneity in representationalfl exibility deficitst hat go beyond the play domain. In further support of our hypothesis, we found that the relationship between generativity and imagination in ASD were processed through visuospatial planning. Confirming Leevers and Harris' (1998)s uggestion abouts ubprocesses involved in spontaneous imaginative drawings, planning may be implicated at several finer levels of problem solving. First, children need to construct av isuospatial representationo ft he generated drawing ideas in working memory. Following that, children need to execute the particular plan whilst maintaining it in working memorya nd matching the drawing that is unfolding in relation to the satisfaction of that plan. Without some degree of concurrentability to graphicallyplan and translate the generated novel ideas forthe drawing task, individuals with ASD may instead execute more familiar drawing schemes. Both generativitya nd visuospatial planning appear uniquely and intimately tied to imagination in ASD.
Our findings that visuospatial planning ability wasrelated to imagination (and even linkedt ofi rst-order ToMw ith agea nd receptive language controlled) in the ASD group but not in the control group tantalisingly suggest that imagination in ASD might be visualization based.V isuospatial planning bridging generativityw ith imaginative drawings in the ASD group may be interpreted as some children with ASD indirectly adoptingastrategy of abstracting schematic impressions of their generated ideas, and then perceptuallymanipulating them to allow creative solutions to be realized. Similarly, our observed relationship between visuospatial planning and first-order ToMinASD may reflect ap roblem solving approach that involves images chemas (e.g.s patial map of corridorsinmazes,spatial coordinates in false belief storyevents) being framed through simulation to allow solutions to emerge ( Barsalou, 1999) . The suggestion that imagery based problem solving could be adopted amongstindividuals with ASD forimaginative drawing ideas would be parsimonious with our other findings that low-level perceptual biases towardsweak coherence were specifically related to drawing style. Interpreted as such, visuospatial planning being parto falink that relates to imagination in ASD is broadly convergentw ith accounts of some individuals with ASD preferring to use a visual thinking style (e.g. Kana, Keller,Cherkassky,M inshew,&Just, 2006) .
We are not,h owever,s uggestingt hat the visuospatial channelling of generated ideas fori magination in ASD is always sufficient or successful. While the generation of relativelys traightforwardi deas fori magination may be grounded in some form of perceptual analysis, the translation and on-linem onitoring of highly complexd rawing solutions would severelytax the capacity limit of imageryresources in working memory (van Sommers,1995) -this may explain whythereisstill an overall ASD group deficit in imaginative drawing content. Moreover,ifindividuals with ASD generate novel ideas at av erys low rate, there would only be al imited set of schemes to creativelyd rawa nd plan from,a nd individuals may in longitudinal assessments startt os how repetitioni n their imaginative drawing ideas.
Further supporting our expectations, we found that variation in generativity did not capture the fulld isplay of imaginative drawing behavioursi nt he ASD group. Generativity (and planning) was related to imaginative drawing content while weak central coherence was related to adrawing style that wasnon-sequential and began with local features. Such findings dovetail with workbyBooth et al. (2003) where planning skills were also not related to how children with ASD tended to stylistically drawr eal world objects. Taken together,neither generativity(with planning) nor weak coherence style canbeconsumed by each other.V ariations in strengths towards weak coherence and weaknesses in generativitya nd planning may even contribute to shaping the different hierarchical levels that makeu pimaginative drawing production.
Our results showt hat variance in the degree of generativity and planning was associated with variability in imagination in the ASD group, but that variance in the degree of first-order false belief reasoning was related to imagination in the TD control group. In one sense, it could be argued that ToM is naturally and normally implicated in imagination.U nderstanding of mentals tates mayn ot turno ut to be associated with imagination in ASD because modular abnormalities in ToMc ould lead individuals to develop specialization in engaging generativity in relation to planning fori magination. Although compelling, this rapprochement may not be sufficiently cogent as certain findings do not easily fit into this account. First, it does not immediately explainw hy individual differences in executive weaknesses (generativity and planning) relate to drawing content but variations in executive strengths (local processing style) relate to drawing style. Second,our exploratorymediational analysis forthe TD group suggested that the means to imagination potentially begins from relatingg enerativity in concert with receptive (grammatical) language ability to false belief reasoning. Confidence in our data is warranted by other concurrentand longitudinal researchshowing that there is astronger direction of effect from executive functioning and language to false belief understanding than the reverse (e.g. Hughes, 1998; Milligan et al.,2 007) .M oreover, several individuals with ASD dide xhibit first-order false belief understanding, albeit achieved through alinguistically based route (suggested via aslightly higher correlation with receptive language ability). In this case, the fact that false belief knowledge still did not correlate with imagination in ASD,s uggests that individuals may have failed to apply that understanding to process imaginative thinking tasks due to parallel limitations in executive functioning skills (Zelazo &M ü ller,2 002). Consequently,w em ay extrapolate that, forindividuals with ASD,spontaneousimagination may be based more upon executive routes irrespective of gained false belief understanding. Relatedly,false belief reasoning may have been used to realize imagination in typical development because individuals in the control group possessed effectivee xecutive control and can use languaget os ervicee xecutive control.F inally, meta-representationalf ocused accounts do not readily explain whyc hildren with ASD also showg enerativity impairments in reality based tasks that requirea ction flexibility (e.g.w ord generation and free recall; see Boucher &L ewis, 1989) .
We do not deny that false belief reasoning can serve as ap rocess forb ringing out imagination,a tl east in typicald evelopment.W ea lso do not deny that mentals tate understanding is easier forTDchildren than it is forchildren with ASD.What is denied is that strengths and weaknesses in mentalistic understanding singularly contribute at a superordinate level to relativef ailures and successes in imagination in ASD and TD groups, respectively. The data across the ASD and TD groups more parsimoniously suggest that generativityisnecessary forimagination but its effects maybedifferentially processed or routed in ASD and in typical development. Our findings that generativityis linkedw ith planning fori magination in the ASD group but instead expressedt hrough false belief reasoning in the control group could more generally suggest cool executive control over imagination in ASD but hot affectivee xecutive control over non-veridical representations in typicald evelopment (cf. Zelazo&M ü ller,2 002).
Our findings raise two exciting theoretical issues fori magination in ASD that await further investigation. First, in light of the concurrentn ature of our data (and a fair numbero fc omparisons to yield the correlations), we cannot makes trong causal claimsa bout how generativity and planning may come to be developmentally associated forimagination in ASD.Steps towardsclarifying such issues could include future researchexamining whether training in generativityand planning are jointly necessary forp rompting imagination in ASD or whether supportt raining in either executive component could sufficiently cue imagination.S econd, it is not clear whether visuospatial planning as ac hannel through which generativity affects imagination is uniquetoimagination in ASD via drawings or whether planning as amediator may also be important forimagination in ASD via apretend play modality.T urner(1997), whilst theoretically committedtorestricted imagination as the result of impaired generativity, remains open to the possibility that differente xecutive control mediatorsm ay be implicated fort ranslating those novel ideas into action ford ifferentsymbolic tasks.
Conclusion
There is an important relationship between generativity and imagination.I nA SD,t he relationship appearstounfoldvia planning, while in typicaldevelopment the link seems to be expressed via consultationw ith receptive languagea nd false belief reasoning. On balance, the relative means by which generativity is unpackedc an contribute to explaining the extent and nature of imagination in ASD and in typicaldevelopment.
